The possibility of civil war in Afghanistan may be subdivided into internal and external, subjective and objective causes, even though they are interconnected. During the previous two decades events happening within Afghanistan has made the country to be one of the most backward and developing countries in the entire world (Dobbins & Malkasian, 2015). The contentious situation currently in the country started during the mid- the 1970s, this was after Prince Mohammed Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah. He ended up abolishing the monarchy and declared himself as the president of the Republic of Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan is essential if the Taliban would have productive peace discussions with the Afghanistan government. For the United States, their priority was ensuring that there is a secure commitment from the Taliban and it would never allow a terrorist group to base themselves in Afghanistan while staging an attack on the United States or even its allies (Dobbins & Malkasian, 2015). The withdrawal of the United States troops can only happen after such agreement is reached and both parties abide by it. The government of the United States will not be unable to remove their footprints entirely if they doubt that there may be a threat to their national security from Afghanistan (Dobbins & Malkasian, 2015).

The best way by which the United States may withdraw their troops from Afghanistan would be by coordination with neighbouring countries. The neighbouring countries have an urgent and in need of a more stable Afghanistan than the United States does. But the United States is unable to co-operate with some of them since they are countries considered as rivals which include China, Iran and Russia among others (Dobbins & Malkasian, 2015). Afghanistan should be left to its fate if proper discussion and agreement are reached between the United States, the Taliban group and the Afghanistan government to ensure that there will be no any threat to national security within Afghanistan and in the United States (Dobbins & Malkasian, 2015). Afghanistan as a country will manage to grow their economy due to the assurance of security and investors from various parts of the world will consider investing in the country.

Balancing competing international and domestic pressures in confronting non-traditional security threats is a complex and delicate undertaking. The planned withdrawal of the United States troops and further declination of the global engagement may leave the country in a vulnerable state due to increased competition from the regional and neighbouring states for the strategic influence within the country (Hirose, Imai & Lyall, 2017). Given the country’s geographic and historical past, it has been argued that international neutrality offers a least and worst but workable solution in the long term to the problem of proxy conflicts which are common within Afghanistan.

‘Bitarafi in Dari’ one of the historical form of neutrality has mostly been considered to be one of the pillars of the country’s security and foreign policy (Hirose, Imai & Lyall, 2017). Bitarafi is formal security and foreign policy which is a continuation of the colonial imposed buffer which was aimed at balancing between the competing and some external forces. Apart from the periods of the two world wars, Afghanistan’s neutrality has been unable to fully conform to the types and definitions of the neutrality which are practices by some other neutral states. The policymakers recognize the lasting peace and stability and also regional cooperation requires solutions within the region.

Reference

Roy, A. (2015). The Algebra of infinite justice. In Contesting Empire, Globalizing Dissent (pp.     33-42). Routledge.

Hirose, K., Imai, K., & Lyall, J. (2017). Can civilian attitudes predict insurgent violence?         Ideology and insurgent tactical choice in civil war. Journal of peace                        research, 54(1), 47-63.

Dobbins, J., & Malkasian, C. (2015). Time to negotiate in Afghanistan: how to talk to the       Taliban. Foreign Affairs, 94(4), 53-64.