Executive Summary

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), whose English translation means ‘Army of the Pure’ is a radical Islamist Group operating in Pakistan. Since it was founded in the 1990s, LeT has performed multiple attacks against civilian and military residencies in India, especially within Kashmir and Jammu. LeT received a lot of global attention for its said participation in the Mumbai Attacks in 2008, which killed 166 people and injured over 300 others. The militant group gets inspiration from another Islamist group in Pakistan called Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), which was started in 1989 by Osama Bin Laden’s Mentor called Abdullah Azzam. In the 90s, MDI officials who fought together with the Taliban during the Soviet-Afghan War started focusing their activities in Kashmir and Jammu regions in India, and that is when they founded LeT.[1]  According to the LeT manifesto, the attacks in Kasmir and Jammu form part of a higher objective to re-establish Islam and its rules in India and other lands that were initially Muslim territories. The leaders of LeT assert that their responsibility and duty is to get these territories back from unbelievers who are not Muslim. LeT has raided attacks on Indian political leaders, security forces and other state institutions through fidayeen attacks, which are attacks directly performed by more than two armed militia members. The militia group has also massacred a lot of people with a specific target on Sikhs, Hindus, and other religious and ethnic minority groups in Kashmir and Jammu.[2] In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government put pressure on the Pakistani Government to do away with jihadist groups that were operating within the US borders. This situation led to the Pakistani government officially banning LeT in 2002.[3] However, the group later reemerged under a different entity called Jamaa-ul-Dawa (JuD). The Pakistani government of Pakistani felt that the group was useful for the country because it enhanced its control over Kashmir and Jammu and therefore the group has continued to receive support from the Pakistan Intelligence Services and military.

Introduction

This article investigates the origin and the likely impending of Lashkar-E-Tayyib (LeT) by focusing on why the group is commonly overlooked by the intelligence and counter-terrorism communities in the West and particularly the U.S. Even with executing the second most lethal terrorist attack subsequent 9/11, LeT has remained under the radar to most of the Western counter-terrorism world. While most of LeT’s activities have been in India sub-continent, nevertheless, this article acknowledges that LeT is a terrorist group with transcontinental reach and motivation.[4] While operating locally, LeT has branches in numerous countries and has openly made threats against the U.S. This article stipulated that understanding its ideology and modus operandi are two of the most significant areas that must be taken into account for a fruitful counter-terrorism approach.

Furthermore, it argues that to understand LeT, it is imperative that we recognize the two qualities that define its missionary and militancy activities in the region. Interestingly, Western recruits come from far more contented upbringings and seem inspired by the organization’s open strategy towards foreigners.[5] Even though there is no tangible evidence that LeT might carry out Mumbai-style attacks on US soil, a significant worry is that its affiliated terrorist groups could employ its network. Moreover, the article suggests that a comprehensive understanding of LeT’s development conveys the most significant implications for U.S. policy since the group constitutes a severe threat to U.S. security interests in the region.

The author’s perspective toward the LeT has evolved, and fueled by an alarming disquietude about its western training recruits in bomb-making as well as assisting them in executing their plans after returning to their respective countries. For this reason, this article intensely focuses on examining the strategic group recruitment in the US along with American relationship with the countries of the Indian sub-continent and their strategic responses to security challenges stemming from Lashkar-E-Tayyiba’s terrorist turmoil.[6] Based on the supporting evidence and analysis, the article provides the implications of the continued efforts to counter the group capability to launch an attack in the US. To sum up, it offers policy and strategic recommendations for the US and Indian sub-continent to lessen LeT’s threats.

 

The leadership of the group

The group was founded in 1990 by Hafiz Muhammad, and he remains the chief authority of the group to present. In the year 2012, the American government placed a $10million bond on Saeed’s head, but he was never captured.[7] At present, Saeed lives as a free citizen in Pakistan. Another leader is Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi who has been a co-founder and the Head of Operations in the group since 1990 to present. Indian officials allegedly found him to be among the leading forces behind the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and he was arrested shortly after that by Pakistani legal authorities.[8] He was however released in 2015 after an anti-terrorism court found him innocent of the charges.

Another leader of LeT is known as Abdul Rehman Makki who is the brother-in-law to Muhammad Saeed and is second in authority for the group. Currently, the US government has placed a $32 million bounty on him because of the close relationship that he had with the late Mullah Omar who was a Taliban leader and Ayman al-Zawahiri who is an Al Qaeda leader.[9] He is, however, a free citizen in Pakistan.

Doctrine and Ideology

LeT follows the Ahl-e-Hadith doctrine which is a Southern Asian form of Salafism and Wahhabism and is said to have originated in the Middle East as well as southern Asia. Similar to Al Qaeda and other famous Salafist parties, LeT has a goal to reclaim territories that they believe were initially Muslim Lands. The group claims that Muslims ruled Andalusia (Spain) for 800 years, but Christians killed all of them with time. They argue that Christians are now the primary rulers of Spain, but they are dedicated to taking it back from them.[10] Similarly, the group claims that the entire Indian Territory was a Muslim Empire, but Islam lost it when they surrendered Jihad, and therefore they aim to reclaim the land that was theirs. They also the Holy Qibla-e-Awwal in Jerusalem and other countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Sicily, Chinese Turkistan, and Russian Turkistan were all Muslim territories, and therefore they must reclaim these lands back from the unbelievers.[11]

Additionally, LeT believes in the Ummah (Global Muslim Community) is supreme over any other secular or democratic state in the world. The group is looking to free Muslim countries especially those around Pakistan from being dominated by non-Islamist states or governments. LeT is rapidly getting involved with the international global jihadist movement and has vowed to plant the Islam flag in Tel Aviv, New Delhi, and Washington. However, its primary focus is in Kashmir and Jammu.[12] This group does not support Jihad efforts in Pakistan because it believes that since Pakistan’s national and primary religion is Islam, the country has an automatic professed faith. Therefore, LeT is focused on improving the interpretation of Ahl-e-Hadith in the country through Islamic missionary tasks.

 

 

Organizational Structure

LeT has built an excellent infrastructure within the Pakistani borders. By the year 2000, this group was reported to have established over 70 district departments and offices that were managing its finances, media, dawa activities, external affairs, and social welfare. LeT has also implemented a department to oversee construction of mosques and madrassas, an educational department, and establishment for teachers, farmers, and doctors, among others.[13] The group’s local operations nationally include 15 Islamic departments and institutions, 136 secondary schools, ambulatory services, blood banks, seminaries, and numerous mobile clinics within the country.

*          Since the Pakistani government banned LeT in 2002, its domestic activities have by far been coordinated by many LeT subscribed organizations such as Idara Khidmat (IKK), Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). Saeed Who is LeT’s chief Emir is also said to be the leader of the Milli Muslim League, which is a political party in Pakistan established in 2017. Although LeT’s missions are based on the interpretation of Islamic and global occurrences, the actions of the group are strongly influenced by the ISI and deeply aligned with the interests of the Pakistani government.[14] There is however no direct proof of support from the Pakistani government, but intelligence services, analysts, researchers, and international humanitarian organizations have often found connections between the group and the Pakistani government.[15]

 

Financing

LeT has rapidly increased its support network in Pakistan through the provision of social, medical, and educational services. The group funds these activities by placing donation boxes in market places and shops throughout Pakistan. Additionally, LeT also collects Ushr, which is a form of Islamic tax on land that mandates farmers to donate at least 10% of their farm produce and incomes to charity work.[16] Similarly, the group earns revenue through businesses that are said to be legitimate such as mobile clinics, agricultural tracts, and fish farming. It also raises taxes through tuition fees from its schools and selling jihadist goods and other materials. Sometimes, LeT traders will require that customers pay an extra 5 to 10 rupees as a symbol of their participation in Jihad.

LeT also uses its global networks and connections to raise funds for its operations. It is alleged that the group receives money donations from Pakistani civilians who live in Europe, and the Persian Gulf. It also accepts donations from Islamic clerics and other individuals from Saudi Arabia who supports and enforce global jihad movements.[17] Through groups like IKK, JuD, and other affiliated organizations, LeT has managed to solicit funds from foreign nations for disaster management and relief, and other humanitarian services within the country. However, the group is often reported to divert relief and charity money to support and fund militant operations.[18] The group is reported to have used the money raised to support victims of the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan to stage the failed attempt of blowing up the Transatlantic Flight in 2006.

 

Why the Pakistani Government cannot completely Outlaw LeT

 

Before trying to understand the intentions and capabilities of LeT, it is essential first to understand the reason why the Pakistani Government is likely not going to ban the group any time. First, the country’s military and Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) consider the group to be the most reliable proxy against India and in providing utility as a result. Secondly, Pakistan is faced with severe jihadist insurgencies, and LeT is among the few militant groups that have a policy against attacking Pakistan and its environs.[19] Therefore, Pakistani authorities do not want to take any action that will trigger LeT to assist with or execute terrorist attacks in the country. Additionally, this group has developed a strong social welfare structure through Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and relegated other legal relief frameworks.

It is, therefore, a concern to start an uproar with the group because of its ability to initiate social upheavals in strongholds like Lahore. Furthermore, LeT helps the government to deal with other groups that cause violence in the state due to rebellion.[20] LeT assists in controlling other jihadist groups from attacking Pakistan by challenging ideologies about waging war against a Muslim state, providing security intelligence against anti-government militants, and sometimes directly targeting anti-government and or state militants.[21] Third, a majority of LeT members have strong relationships with members serving in the Pakistani Military Forces meaning that the Pakistani Government has provided the group with freedom of movement that enables it to develop the capacity and capabilities to make threats to the United States.

 

LeT’s Recruitment in the West and Support Networks

LeT primarily train Pakistanis to serve in their camps, but the group has historically been found also to teach foreigners. Following a counterattack in Afghanistan by the US that destroyed LeT’s infrastructure for training in the country,  the group sought out to train local and foreign militants who before 9/11 trained in Al Qaeda camps but were now looking for alternative avenues for training.[22] From the mid-1990s, LeT has trained Indian Muslims instructing them to attack their state, and this practice continues to date. Some of the trained militants have waged attacks on behalf of LeT and gave the group unquestioned deniability, while other militants volunteered to offer logistical assistance to LeT members who have infiltrated the India territory to wage attacks.[23] Other trained militants are connected with various jihadist movements such as the India Mujahideen and have now settled in India as sleeper agents whom Indian authorities fear to rise at any time.

 

LeT also has a long history of recruiting and training westerners. A good number of them are members of the Kashmir and Pakistani states living in the UK, but Let has been found to train Americans since 2001.[24] The first American citizens that trained with LeT hailed from Virginia and made part of a jihadist movement that was known as the Virginia Jihad Network. A LeT commander in charge of overseas operations called Sajid Mir organized for some of the diasporas LeT members offer assistance to an English LeT militant who visited the US several times between 2002 and 2003 to purchase military equipment for the group.[25] In 2004, Mir also asked two militant trainees to start a mission to gather information and also disseminate propaganda. One of the trainees revealed to the US FBI that he was explicitly required to conduct surveillance on a Maryland chemical plant.[26] It remains unknown what LeT planned to do with such information, but it is clear that they were aiming to expand their network in to America. LeT has also trained other militants residing in the US, one of them being Daood Gilani, who in 2006 posed as David Coleman Headley to facilitate his investigation trips in Mumbai and other states on behalf of the group.[27] Gilani went through several tests and specialized training and conducted surveillance in the Indian Territory that eventually led to the Mumbai Attacks in 2008. It is clear that without Gilani’s help and contributions in terms of investigation, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the Mumbai attacks would not have been successful.[28] Although there have never been any attacks on the US soil by the LeT, analysts predict that this could be done in the future.

 

Why LeT could plan an attack in the US

LeT is committed to defending Islamic territories and getting revenge for what the group perceives to be violence and oppression of Muslims. The US has previously invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and also used drones to launch missile attacks in Pakistan and other Muslim countries.[29] These factors make the US an undeniable target for jihadist groups such as LeT. For decades, India has been the primary enemy and target of LeT and the group has never openly accepted to have any affiliations with Al Qaeda.[30] However, the US is obviously on the group’s enemies list. Since the 9/11 attacks, the groups has turned its anti-American mantra in to action. Since 2004, the group has actively attacked US citizens, and US coalition forces in Afghanistan, and LeT’s presence in the state has increased in the past several years.[31] The group has also deployed small numbers of militants to Iraq to help the country following the US invasion of Iraq.  Furthermore LeT has killed Americans as well as other westerners in terror attacks in Mumbai and India and participated in other plans to target Americans.^{[[32]] [[33]]} The group has a lot of resources and capabilities to wage terrorist attacks outside India and Asian countries including the US. The group is most likely thinking about plans to wage those attacks. However, it remains a crucial debate as to whether the LeT would engage in unilateral attacks against the US territory.[34]  There has never been any evidence showing the LeT plans to attempt an attack against the US despite the group having access to some American residents and citizens.

Recommendations: what should the US do?

First of all, the US should look to reallocate and realigned intelligence resources far away from Al Qaeda and other jihadist militants. The funds should be focused on analysts and officers who have the expertise and professionalism to identify emerging, transitioning, and evolving jihadist threats from LeT and other terrorist groups.[35] This enormous effort will help to reveal relevant information about LeT’s plans and ideas at critical periods during the group’s evolution. Also, LeT has had the same leaders since the group was founded and these leaders are growing older and tired with time. The US could work to explore ways in which there would emerge a battle for succession.[36] A battle like this would help scatter the group and interfere with any upcoming plans against the US.

Secondly, the US should keep on pursuing actions that would be necessary to dismantle and degrade international organizations and networks that support LeT, and attempt to contain the group’s operations outside of Pakistan.[37] The US-India group on Counterterrorism has been in operation for more than a decade, and cooperation between the US and India increased significantly after the Mumbai attacks in 2008. However, enhancement and engagement of counterterrorism efforts have gone down since then.[38] It is essential for the two countries to regenerate this engagement and cooperate with other countries like The United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to dismantle and discourage recruitment and financing of LeT from overseas.[39]

Third, the US can opt to target westerners who are trained by LeT and ensure that Washington increases pressure on the Pakistani government to recognize, identify, arrest, and deport any individual from the west who attempts to train or is training with the group.[40] The US should also warn Pakistan and its military and intelligence services that there would be severe consequences and bloodshed if LeT or any of its affiliates mounted or launched any form of attack on the US homeland.

Conclusion

In conclusion, LeT is an Islam jihadist movement that believes that it has a responsibility to reclaims all lands that were historically Muslim Territories and to wage war to any country or person that oppresses or mistreated Muslims anywhere in the world. The group has termed the Kashmir and Jammu areas in India as their primary targets but will not hesitate to wage war against any other country or state that it views as a threat. Although the group has not yet put any direct threat to attack the US, it has targeted US citizens in different countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.  LeT is capable of posing a threat to America. The group has practiced significant degrees of planned restraints given its abilities suggesting that the group cannot be deterred. It is crucial for the US to remain vigilant and attentive to the evolving and enhanced threats and should take appropriate measures to degrade and dismantle the group before an attack occurs.

 

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[1] D’Souza, Shanthie Mariet, and Bibhu Prasad Routray. “Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir: actors, agendas and expanding benchmarks.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 4 (2016): 557-577.

[2] Mannes, Aaron, Jana Shakarian, Amy Sliva, and V. S. Subrahmanian. “A computationally-enabled analysis of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.” In 2011 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, pp. 224-229. IEEE, 2011.

 

[3] Schneider, Erich B. Balancing the trinity: the US approaches to marginalizing Islamic militancy in Pakistan. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA, 2013.

 

[4] Kambere, Geoffrey, Puay Hock Goh, Pranav Kumar, and Fulgence Musafir. “The Financing of Lashkar-e-Taiba.” Combating Terrorism Exchange 1, no. 1 (2011): 18.

[5] Tankel, Stephen. Storming the world stage: The story of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Oxford University Press (UK), 2013.

[6] LaFree, Gary, Sue‐Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw. “Trajectories of terrorism: Attack patterns of foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970–2004.” Criminology & Public Policy 8, no. 3 (2009): 445-473

[7] Shafqat, Saeed. “5 From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba.” (2002).

[8] A Mumbai attack suspect Lakhvi released on bail in Pakistan”. BBC News. 10 April 2015.

[9] Parashar, Sachin (5 April 2012). “Hafiz Saeed’s brother-in-law Abdul Rehman Makki is a conduit between Lashkar-e-Taiba and Taliban.” The Times of India.

[10] Tankel, Stephen. “Pakistani militancy in the shadow of US withdrawal.” Pakistan’s enduring challenges (2015): 27-54.

 

[11] Fair, C. Christine. “Leader-Led Jihad in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the 2008 Mumbai Attack.” Available at SSRN 1753767 (2009).

 

[12] Bergen, Peter L., and Bruce Hoffman. Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group. Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010.

 

[13] Singh, Narendar. “Jamaat-ud-Dawa (Lashkar-e-Tayyaba).” Available at SSRN 3274368 (2018)

 

[14] Rassler, Don, C. Christine Fair, Anirban Ghosh, Arif Jamal, and Nadia Shoeb. The fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, training, deployment, and death. MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT NY COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, 2013.

 

[15] Tankel, Stephen. “Confronting Pakistan’s Support for Terrorism: Don’t Designate, Calibrate.” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2016): 165-179.

 

[16] Freeman, Michael, ed. Financing terrorism: case studies. Routledge, 2016.

[17] Kumar, Pranav, Puay Hock Goh, and Geoffrey Kambere. “Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).” In Financing Terrorism, pp. 85-102. Routledge, 2016.

 

[18] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Tara Vassefi. “Violent Nonstate Actors in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship: Historical Context and Future Prospects.” Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges (2015): 278.

 

[19] Sawant, Anshul, John P. Dickerson, Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, and V. S. Subrahmanian. “Automated generation of counterterrorism policies using multi-expert input.” ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST) 6, no. 4 (2015): 44.

[20] LaFree, Gary, Sue‐Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw. “Trajectories of terrorism: Attack patterns of foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970–2004.” Criminology & Public Policy 8, no. 3 (2009): 445-473.

 

[21] Fair, C. Christine. “Lashkar-e-Taiba beyond Bin Laden: Enduring challenges for the region and the international community.” Testimony Prepared for the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee’Hearing on “Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” May 24 (2011).

[22] Bergen, Peter L., and Bruce Hoffman. Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group. Bipartisan Policy Center, 2010.

 

[23] White, Joshua. “A Cooperative Jihad? The Religious Logic of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and the Limits of Pan-Sunni Cooperation in Pakistan.” Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges (2015): 55-71.

 

[24] Subrahmanian, V. S., Aaron Mannes, Amy Sliva, Jana Shakarian, and John P. Dickerson. Computational analysis of terrorist groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.

 

[25] Woods, Joshua. “Framing terror: an experimental framing effects study of the perceived threat of terrorism.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 4, no. 2 (2011): 199-217.

 

[26] Singh, Colonel Ratanjit. “CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES.”

 

[27] Sørensen, Kaare. The Mind of a Terrorist: The Strange Case of David Headley. Penguin UK, 2016.

 

[28] Jain, Harshvardhan, and Mayank Rautela. “Overview of Plea Bargaining in India.” (2018)

[29] Fair, C. Christine. “Author’s Response: The United States Needs a New Policy toward Pakistan.” (2015): 178-182

[30] Epstein, Susan B., and K. Alan Kronstadt. “Pakistan: United States Foreign Assistance.” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East 3, no. 2 (2012): 241.

 

[31] Pande, Aparna, ed. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan. Routledge, 2017.

[32] Tankel, Stephen. Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past operations and prospects. New America Foundation, 2011

[33] Siyech, Mohammed Sinan. “A typology of insurgent, terrorist and extremist threats in India.” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13, no. 2 (2018): 231-251.

[34] Mannes, Aaron, Jana Shakarian, Amy Sliva, and V. S. Subrahmanian. “A computationally-enabled analysis of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks in Jammu and Kashmir.” In 2011 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, pp. 224-229. IEEE, 2011.

 

[35] Webb, S. T. (2015). Lashkar-e-Taiba: Regional Insurgent Group or Emerging International Threat?. In Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War (pp. 186-197). Routledge.

 

[36] Dickerson, John P., Aaron Mannes, and V. S. Subrahmanian. “Dealing with Lashkar-e-Taiba: A multi-player game-theoretic perspective.” In 2011 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, pp. 354-359. IEEE, 2011.

 

[37] Sikand, Yoginder. “The Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-e-Taiba.” The practice of war: Production, reproduction, and communication of armed violence (2007): 215-38.

 

[38] Jain, Harshvardhan, and Mayank Rautela. “Overview of Plea Bargaining in India.” (2018).

 

[39] Biersteker, Thomas J., and Sue E. Eckert, eds. Countering the financing of terrorism. Routledge, 2007

[40] Epstein, Susan B., and K. Alan Kronstadt. “Pakistan: United States Foreign Assistance.” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East 3, no. 2 (2012): 241.